'Confessional culture' is a particularly controversial aspect of tabloidization, condemned by many within the media industry as trivial or even degrading. Others argue that, apart from the positive audience response, public explorations of the subjective are an important flexing of the boundary between the public/rational/masculine and the private/affective/female domains. Having first considered the debate over confessional culture, the article then suggests, on the basis of three case illustrations, that there is little sign of hard news losing its privileged position in the press and in television news. What then is the significance of the confessional genre and why does it appeal to men as well as women? Under the risk conditions of late modernity, men are having to learn new emotional and relationship skills. Given that media directed at men remain cautious in their treatment of emotional work, the article concludes that this 'confessional' writing provides a culturally acceptable form of lifestyle guide. K E Y W O R D S gender modernity news values public sphere tabloidization
Introduction
Tabloidization, a shorthand for a complex bundle of causes and effects as media chase audiences, persists as a hot topic of UK media trade talk. Discussion initially centred on newspapers. The focus then switched to television news with the success, in November 1998, of the Channel 3 franchisees' campaign to move their main evening news bulletin from 10.00 pm to 6.30 pm, effectively abandoning an all-adult audience. Simultaneously the BBC was reviewing the content, 'address' and presentational style of all its bulletins and Channel 4 was modifying the format of its highly regarded 7.00 pm news programme. A key stimulus seems to have been the more colourful, informal and mobile approach adopted by Channel 5 news. Mocked by competitors during the planning stage, its success -particularly given the channel's overall lack of impact -undermined previous certainties.
The Channel 5 mission was clear: to attract younger viewers. Even the editor of The Times, Peter Stothard (1997) , will admit to this: 'They are postmodern, post-serious, post-literate . . . it is our job to meet them half way.' He also concedes the need to appeal to 'casual buyers' from the 'bigger, hardworking, time-obsessed class of decision-makers'. What he is too coy to acknowledge, however, is the extent to which tabloidization is widely understood to be feminization. Engel (1996) , in one of the definitive accounts of the phenomenon, quotes Charles Moore, editor of The Daily Telegraph, as explaining that 'people woke up to the fact that 50 percent of the readers were women.' A little disingenuous perhaps -what awakened newspaper managements was finally grasping the impact of the changes in the composition of the UK labour market: women now have relatively greater disposable income and consequently increased influence over household spending decisions.
Thus the media must appeal directly to women as purchasers of the paper or selector of television channel, in addition to their customary positioning as targets of advertising. This appeal, however, remains conventional: 'it means a stronger sense of the human interest in a story,' according to Moore.
Here we see a link to another manifestation of tabloidization, so-called 'confessional culture', a genre linking radio and television talk shows with columns in broadsheet Sunday newspapers. The minutiae of the daily domestic round, emotional struggles with partner or children or confrontation with potentially terminal illness are being given space in media addressed to Stothard's 'decision-makers'. What the satirical magazine Private Eye has called the New Solipsism is condemned by many as a descent into trivia. An alternative interpretation is that we are witnessing a deeply significant and liberatory breaking of the boundary between the private, domestic, feminine world of emotion and the public, masculine, rational world of men.
In this article I first review the symptoms of tabloidization and its aetiology. The second section considers whether there is evidence of any substantial shift in the epistemology, politics and symbolism of UK news media that would support the claims about private/public permeability. Is the crucial boundary between what is regarded as 'hard news' and the scorned 'soft news' shifting? Finally I argue that the fascination with the private realm follows not from a change in the institutional order but from new requirements, in the 'risk' conditions of late modernity, that men acquire skills in emotional work formerly relegated to women.
Denials, lamentations and justifications
Not all protagonists in the tabloidization debate concede that it exists. Stothard (1997) , among others, argues that much of the lamentation stems from misplaced nostalgia, thus backing himself into the curious position of claiming that The Times used not to be as high quality or important as people now believe. In both the USA and in continental Europe, he suggests, newspapers have been able to maintain a more elitist and sententious style through a mixture of monopoly and regulation, neither of which apply to the UK national press. Stothard's position, although patronizing about the intellectual quality of the contemporary audience, is a classic defence of the sovereignty of the consumer in a competitive market.
Financial imperatives also figure prominently in less complaisant accounts. Engel (1996) asserts that the 1986 launch of The Independent, in the context of shrinking overall readership, destabilized the cosy carve-up of the UK national broadsheet market along class and political lines. The resulting 'super competition' (as Tunstall, 1996 , describes it) has driven managements to add pages and sections in the hope of increasing revenue through sales and advertising. At the same time newspaper staffs -apart from a handful of highly paid brandname columnists -are fewer, younger, London-based and desk-bound. 'News is the chief victim of the corporate squeeze because it is time-consuming to collect' (Cohen, 1998) . Hard-driven and hard-driving bosses and a workforce that is insecurely employed, pressured and inexperienced have, between them, made metropolitan newspapers perversely parochial, Cohen argues, cut off from the realities of life outside London. Cohen's implicit explanatory frame is, like Engel's, materialist, but he also suggests that the 'crypto-conservative philosophy of postmodernism' has been used as a justification for abandoning absolute standards of social significance. Farndon (1996) , at that time editor of the Press Gazette, also introduces wider sociocultural factors into his account of tabloidization, notably geopolitical change. Britons now have fewer reasons to be interested in, or threatened by, international events.
Although he does not call it postmodernism, Farndon also comments on a 'visually, electronically based culture which levels out hierarchy and scales of value'. His last sentence, however, talks of the 'neglect of that priceless publishing asset, editorial acumen and courage'. As befits a press man talking primarily to print journalists, Farndon's perspective focuses on the individual professional actor: timid executives, illiterate sub-editors, a decline in personal morality on the part both of producers and audience, the antics of celebrities and 'people willing to act as accomplices of the media by participating in the confessional culture'.
Catharsis or commodity?
Farndon's distaste is manifest; he refers to 'self-indulgent I-me-mine columnists prattling happily about plumbers and dandruff' in the context of a 'therapised, Oprahfied culture' that reflects 'a decline of reserve and discretion in personal matters'. Keep the private and the public realms as separate as they should be, in other words. This unease about the morality of self-revelation has been given official voice in the Annual Report of the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC, 1998) which criticized 'victim television', particularly daytime studio-based shows in which the emotional pitch is raised for dramatic, rating-grabbing effect. Roy Greenslade (1997) , former tabloid editor and now media commentator, acknowledges the professional hostility to 'ego columns' and writes that he needed to be 'convinced of the validity of this kind of journalism'.
Specifically in relation to Diamond and Picardie he concludes that it is a justifiable activity for journalists. His main reason is telling: that the experiences recounted, although personal, are universal. This, he implies, legitimates journalism that both makes an emotional appeal to readers and is not 'news'.
No such accommodation is forthcoming from Michael Collins (1998). In a piece described by John Diamond (1998) in a rejoinder as 'sour', Collins sweeps up such columnists with chat show hosts and self-revealing modern artists. His surface accusation is that all are profiting from the commodification of emotion:
The once legendary reserve and stiff upper lip has been usurped by a need to wear our hearts on our sleeve -Tears'r'Us . . . That first bouquet laid in the wake of the Hillsborough disaster ultimately led to the flowers, hearts and teddies outside the royal palaces . . . The gesture became a ritual.
It is not hard to read the subtext. This 'talk-show sensibility' is a feminine sensibility with the potential to undermine the national culture and institutional order -and it is vulgar as well.
Despite Collins' and other jibes about a postmodernism/tabloidization nexus, news media organizations remain unreconstructedly modernist. As we have seen, much of the agitation about tabloidization is about the erosion of the core activity of gathering and publishing 'hard news'. Hard news is discursively constructed as being about events and processes of the public world: 'containing little description, journalist comment or analysis' (Keeble, 1998: 304) . Not merely are they empiricists, it has been remarked that journalists are among the world's last positivists (Gans, 1979) . Their commitment to the separation of fact and value is over-determined. It justifies personal detachment when reporting the terrible or sordid. UK broadcasting has, second, the legal requirement of 'impartiality' statutorily embedded in it.
Finally, as Schudson (1989) among others has pointed out, the claim to neutral factuality has an economic benefit: it makes news a more tradable commodity, as much now as when the electric telegraph was invented in the mid 19th century.
In this world of absolutes, gender is no exception. Mainstream news media represent gender as a binary opposition. That they do so in their texts is well established, whether it is The Sun's organizing principle of 'sexual drama' (Holland, 1987 (Holland, , 1998 or the paired symbols on the sofas of daytime television.
The conviction that female and male are essentially different, with different qualities and capacities is also inscribed in newspaper organization and working practices. Thus men will be sent to report and comment on the closure of the tin mine, while women will write the background features about the impact on isolated rural communities. The strongly held belief that women have a different orientation to news seems to be confirmed by research commissioned for Women in Journalism (1997: 57) . When reading newspapers, more women than men are 'very interested' in medicine and health, education, food and recipes, profiles of people in the news and horoscopes.
This finding appears to justify the further domain assumption that women are more interested in 'soft news', a residual and lower status category that journalists use freely but have difficulty in defining precisely: a 'light news story that can be more colourful, witty, commenty than the hard news story' (Keeble, 1998: 309) . It embraces 'human interest', that is, the impact of major events on individuals, the dramatic experiences of people who occupy no socially significant position and, conversely, the unremarkable aspects of the personal lives of the well-known.
Soft news, to put it another way, is about personal relationships, domestic life and emotional work. These continue to be socially constructed as women's responsibilities, as they have been since the bourgeois private sphere was established in the context of 19th century industrial capitalism. 'As the workplace became separated from the home, so a private, domestic sphere was created for women, divorced from the public world of work, office and citizenship' (Lewis, 1984: x) . There can be little doubt that confessional culture, whether reflecting light-heartedly on quotidian domestic concerns or on struggles to manage the emotional and relational fall-out of illness or family conflict, is about what has been conventionally classified as women's work.
For commentators like Collins (1998) , however, the problem is not that there is more emotion slopping around, with proliferating columns and problem pages in the broadsheets, but that it appears to be infiltrating the public world of events. Coverage of any disaster occurring in the UK will now include an account of the support offered to victims and the bereaved as one of the standard 'angles' (Aldridge, 1994: 141-5) . During the television coverage of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict, male relatives of members of the Task Force were asked their opinion while female 'wives and sweethearts' had their emotions described second-hand (Glasgow University Media Group, 1985) . By the time of the Gulf War of 1991, aircrews were talking to camera of their fear and of crying with relief on safe return. In 1998, BBC radio news reported that RAF pilots were resentful that their emotional state was not considered when US/UK strikes against Iraq were suspended when they were already airborne. It has also become customary to emphasize the seriousness of a crime by reporting the distress caused to investigating police officers. Are these not examples of the domestic and personal being treated as public issues? If so, given the complex interlocked relationship between media organizations, economy, polity and consumer, does this not in turn constitute evidence that the conventional boundary between the public sphere of men and rationality and the private sphere of women and emotion is flexing, or even being dismantled?
The public/private distinction is so constitutive of news organizations and news texts that such a shift in the hierarchy of matters of public concern would inevitably be reflected in a fundamental change not only of style but of priorities. In the next section I shall argue, from specific instances, that there is little evidence of this occurring.
Three case illustrations

Newspapers: balancing hard news and the soft sell
Newspaper design, like newspaper content, is deliberately contrived to present new material within a comfortably familiar framework. Tabloidization refers to a convergence of both style and news values. What is less remarked upon is that the basic architecture of all UK weekday newspapers, whether national or local, has been so similar for so long. Despite the increased pagination and multiplying sections, the status order remains unchanged. Thus, The Sun and The Guardian, superficially so different, share the same deep logic. Accordingly, in trade talk, fundamental redesign is a high-risk move; the fear is that readers will not recognize 'their' paper or will fail to understand the new logic and signposting. Radical departures from semiotic conventions, like The Independent's first, short-lived, shift to a more 'magazine' format, are interpreted as signs of desperation.
Page one of a newspaper may have mythic status but its importance is real, as it still carries whatever the paper deems to be the most significant news of the day and will have been approved by the most senior editor on duty. While the actual 'news' content may be shrinking, news is still privileged by occupying the first pages of what is usually called the 'main' paper, just as the newsroom dominates the topography of a newspaper office. Home news will precede international news (if any). Similarly, the editorial voice of the paper, expressed in the leader column, will be harmonized and consolidated with a political cartoon and pieces by named commentators on public issues, specifically not the private life and dilemmas genre. Obituaries -another index of the newspaper's scale of public sphere values -and readers' letters will also form part of the package. As Hall et al. (1978) point out, the heavy editorial control of letters is at once understood and completely obscured. They appear to be a spontaneous manifestation of the audience, seemingly representative in the statistical sense, but are selected to confirm the paper's reflexive link with its readers.
In every sector of the market this grouping, with its implicit statement of the newspaper's claim to represent its readers and at the same time to be a site of political importance in its own right, is carefully segregated from the 'lifestyle' material -entertainment, reviews, food, fashion, celebrity profiles, health -upon which its profitability may well depend. The breaking up of papers into discrete sections has made this hard/soft distinction even more obvious and, in some cases, its gendering too. Both The Sun and The Mirror have weekday supplements on football and for women.
Among the broadsheets, sections devoted to business, jobs and education (for producers more than consumers) suggest little modification of the public/ private boundary. Sport, meanwhile, merits a discussion of its own. Ostensibly an aspect of leisure it cannot be contained within the contemporary private realm. Always an expression of the politics of locality and of the nation state sport is now, as part of promotional culture, completely incorporated into the economy. One could argue that it exists in a parallel male universe where the back page is the front and where, as the man said, football is more important than life and death.
Of all the UK national daily papers, one might expect the centre-left Guardian, badge of social progressivism and liberal values, to valorize the private as well as the public. Yet here, too, the distinction between private trouble and public issue (as C. Wright Mills put it) remains essentially unaltered. The second most important news page (being on the right hand) is page three. It seems to have become The Guardian's ludic allusion to tabloidization, often occupied by rock-star marital problems or a dramatic criminal trial before a series of pages devoted to home and international hard news. Moreover, The Guardian has, in G2, a daily tabloid section which contains no news at all. It has a weekly problem page in which the epistemology is even more telling than the topics discussed. Readers are invited to send a problem to which a selection of replies is then published. The discourse is individual psychological, usually a lay version of transactional or cognitive therapies. 'Assert your emotional and developmental rights'; 'What interpersonal game are you playing?' are typical styles of response. There is absolutely no analytic link between the dilemmas of, for example, caring for an elderly step-parent or a direction-less late teenage son, and the news of changing patterns of family formation, conflicts over National Health Service priorities, or the structure of the labour market to be found in the main paper. In relation to the employment prospects of unqualified young men the closest approach to a social structural explanatory frame was a respondent's reference to 'this generation of "lost boys" ' (The Guardian, 21 December 1998). Self-help at the level of group support is sometimes advocated, but pressure for political change or collective campaigning never.
Re-presenting television news
UK broadcasting may be statutorily bound to the notion that news can be subjected to value-free selection and exposition but it is still, as Schlesinger (1987) observed, also a branch of show business. The BBC's 1998 'once in a generation' overhaul of its terrestrial television news bulletins vividly demonstrated the tension between these worlds. On the one hand, presenters are characterized as professional journalists, a neutral conduit of self-evidently important information making a cognitive appeal to the viewer. On the other hand, the changed arrangements have manifestly been driven by a theory of audience identification, an appeal at a non-rational, affective level. 'Executives . . . had argued over whether journalistic experience or viewer popularity was the most important quality in the news presenting team' (The Guardian, 19 December 1998).
The two most significant bulletins in the review were the Six O'Clock News and the Nine O'Clock News, 1 both on BBC1. The early evening programme has the biggest audience of the day and is linked with substantial regional coverage which is both popular and essential to its imputed audience: a family (including children) at home having their evening meal. Even more importantly, this time slot is thought to be a vital 'anchor' for evening viewing. Schedulers believe that, once tuned in, viewers tend to stay with the same channel. News topics and the presentational style are tailored to fit and have been described as 'people oriented' (Cottle, 1993) . Even so, 'the Six' was not, according to 'new face' Huw Edwards, going to 'dumb down'. ' "There's a hell of a difference between over-simplifying or patronising people by leaving things out and making an effort to give people a bit of context and explain things in a non-elitist way without jargon" ' (The Guardian, 19 December 1998). In this formulation Edwards reaffirms himself as the trusted teacher, yet he also symbolizes the new consumerist recognition of the audience. Aged 37 on appointment, he is neatly centred in the typical family formation life stage. Moreover he is obviously Welsh; literally a non-metropolitan voice -an important consideration given the BBC's 'promise' 'in the context of devolution to make sure that we serve the whole of the UK' (BBC, 1999). Clearly it was intended that even the BBC's most private realm-oriented news output will continue to be driven by hard news, with its associated values of rationality and the public interest. Despite a smaller audience, however, the flagship was the Nine O'Clock News, metonym for the corporation's standing in the nation and Britain's in the world. Here the contrast with Van Zoonen's (1991) description of the 'intimization' of Dutch television news could not be starker. No change was to be made to the presenting team, Michael Buerk (then 52) and Peter Sissons (then 56) two white men of an age which signifies experience but who are not marked by obvious regional or class indicators. The very embodiment, in short, of authority in the contemporary UK.
One aspect of Michael Buerk's reputation as a journalist is that he was a foreign correspondent. Foreign coverage is indexical of the stature both of individuals and news media organizations (Aldridge, 1998; Pedelty, 1995; Tunstall, 1971) . Foreign correspondent is the specialism with the highest status as it implies the greatest degree of the profession's cherished autonomy.
Similarly international news, or lack of it, is an implicit statement of market niche. Over this The Sun and The Guardian certainly do part company. The announcement that the Nine O'Clock News is to be 'at least 50 percent led by foreign news' (The Guardian, 19 December 1998) was a very powerful coded assertion of the BBC's position of authority in relation to other media and in the symbolic order of the nation. Secure in the recent renewal of its royal charter and restated national role (CM 3248, 1996) it claims the right to define the public interest -even to the extent of risking viewers' boredom -and locates the corporation as an integral part of, not merely the public world of policy and politics, but of the public sphere. It hardly needs saying that no concessions are being made to the discourses or issues of emotional or domestic work. The Nine O'Clock News does not, and will not, end with quirky tales of kittens who survived a trip round a tumble-dryer.
The message in the Mail
To say 'tabloidization' is to trigger images of parochial, cosy, fragmented The Daily Mail has always been aimed at women readers and has the largest proportion of female readers among UK national daily newspapers. Its pitch is petit bourgeois and patriarchal. Compared with the North American and European press, UK national newspapers are less bound by conventions of objectivity and the separation of news and comment. Even within the UK context, however, the Daily Mail is unusually politicized: hard news stories usually embody a clear point of view, conveyed both through the overall structure (for instance the choice of 'authorized knower') and the language used (typically the disfavoured party will 'admit', 'deny' or 'claim').
Where The Sun's organizing principle is sexual drama, the Daily Mail's is familism. The paper relentlessly promotes a structural-functionalist account of the necessity of the gender division of labour for social cohesion and existential security. Like all UK news media, its coverage of the Paddington rail crash of 5 October 1999 was very extensive. One of the most shocking aspects of the accident was that it was more than a week before the police could confirm how many had died, let alone identify them all. Nevertheless, on the third day of coverage the Daily Mail front-page standfirst opened 'They were like the best of us, early risers, hard workers, family supporters'. One of the supporting features, illustrated with pictures of a woman with her granddaughter lighting a candle and of a bouquet from a child, was headlined 'For all those daddies who will not be coming home' even though paragraph six ran, '. . . two days on, no one was sure who was dead' (Daily Mail, 8 October 1999 ). In Mailworld masculine and feminine are essential, complementary and of equal value but occupy separate spheres. In the last analysis, male authority must prevail and women accept their place. The paper's intense and longstanding hostility to social work and to aspects of the state education system is paradigmatic of its philosophy (Aldridge, 1994 (Aldridge, , 1999 . The state should be strong and effective, able to catch and punish criminals, including dangerous parents. But it should not inculcate notions that children have rights on a par with their parents, either through the malign influence of liberal educationalists or absurdly client-oriented social workers.
Representations of women in the
In its 'address', then, the Daily Mail could be seen as the apotheosis of confessional culture. Its sales are increasing; it is widely admired and feared within the industry, becoming Newspaper of the Year 1998. 'The former Independent editor . . . and his successor both emphasise the success of the Mail in influencing the quality papers' (Engel, 1996) . Far from breaching the conventional public/private sphere boundary, however, securing the bourgeois order is at the heart of its mission.
Stopping the clock of modernization?
There is no doubt that there have been major changes in the style of UK news presentation and increased time/space given to soft news topics. Does this reflect society-wide realignment of the conventional, profoundly gendered distinction between matters of public concern and the personal realm? Apparently not: whatever their market niche, UK national weekday papers continue to privilege conventional hard news as does the BBC in its most important bulletin. Meanwhile, the Daily Mail, one of the most consistently successful national newspapers, actively promotes this boundary. Yet it cannot be the case that the increased media content dealing with the subjective and domestic is being consumed only by women, so what does this say about men and the politics of emotion? The key lies in the changing family/economy nexus.
'Without the nuclear family there would be no bourgeois society with its typical pattern of life and work'; 'An alliance of male-inspired philosophy, religion and science . . . ties the whole thing up with the "essence" of the woman and the "essence" of the man' (Beck, 1986 (Beck, /1992 ). On these 'essences' is based the conventional gender division of labour in which the 'reconstitution of the family on a daily basis' (Graham, 1983: 23 ) is women's work.
For immediate practical reasons, much of the energy of the 20th century women's movement has gone into drawing attention to the physical demands of child-rearing and home-making. As drudgery has been reduced, so the issue of emotional work has become more visible and more discussed (see, for example, Graham, 1983; Hochschild, 1983; James, 1989) although it hasironically -always been clearly identified as essential by conservative theorists. 'The family is specifically treated as a network of emotional relationships, the mutual affection of its members in our society being held to be the most important basis of their solidarity and loyalty' (Parsons, 1959: 262) .
What Parsons did not acknowledge, however, was that the whole edifice depended utterly on the widespread availability of a 'family wage', that is, secure employment for relatively young men which pays enough (or nearly enough) to support a household. The disappearance of this type of employment has been a core element of UK industrial change, whether through the destruction of whole industrial sectors (mining; heavy engineering) or deteriorated terms of employment (the privatized utilities and local government). As Beck (1986 Beck ( /1992 108, emphasis in original) eloquently explains, thus has the 'modern feudal gender order' been destabilized a century after the industrialization which put it in place. The consequent liberation from conventional gender roles and dependencies is, however, a Pyrrhic victory. Newly 'individuated' citizens must renegotiate every aspect of identity and private life, while confronting a labour market in which fewer, rather than more, concessions are now made to non-work responsibilities.
Thus what apologists of capitalism portray as an abundance of choice, Beck has classically defined as 'risk'. This theorization persuasively explains two further characteristics of late modernity: a preoccupation with authenticity and the desire to construct what Giddens, in Modernity and Self-Identity, has called 'pure relationships', whether based on sexual intimacy or platonic friendship. Such relationships are 'sought only for what the relationship can bring to the partners involved' (Giddens, 1991: 90) . This aspiration is now so deeply culturally embedded that it is necessary to remind ourselves that until relatively recently, for instance, the only respectable ways out of a woman's parental home were marriage (with little prospect of divorce), live-in employment, or living in lodgings, all of which could entail close relationships that were not perceived as freely chosen.
'The pure relationship is a key environment for building the reflexive project of the self, since it both allows for and demands organised and continuous self-understanding' (Giddens, 1991: 186) . But in pure relationships, as Giddens (1991: 90) drily observes, it is very difficult to ' "coast along" '. They require continuous work which cannot now be delegated to women, either as a class or individually. Notions of trust and commitment are necessarily bound into the project and produce the constant implicit or explicit questioning of 'Who am I? Who are you?' which underlies the contemporary preoccupation with authenticity. Postmodernist assertions that we have a portfolio of selves are directly contradicted by the pervasive demand for the authentic, whether in attempts to recapture the sound of music as it would have been heard by the composer, or the decline of fictional television genres in favour of more or less serious factual programming. If there is widespread acceptance that the self is multi-faceted, situational and relational, why is any disjunction between public persona and private behaviour excoriated as 'hypocrisy', today's capital crime? In a world according to Baudrillard, the British public should have revelled in their multiple monarchy: perfect spectacle and dysfunctional family. Instead the outcome has been disillusion, disenchantment and loud demands to be transparent and consistent.
This reflexive project of the self, Giddens (1991) further argues, has generated a demand for 'lifestyle guides'. His discussion includes a number of specific examples, most of them health-related, like Bodysense by Vernon Coleman, a medical doctor who, among other activities, has been a controversial columnist in The Sun. Healthcare advice, although widely understood to be consumed more avidly by women, is not necessarily gendered in its address. By contrast, there is a large and longstanding category of guide which Giddens does not remark upon, although its explicit purpose is to provide advice and support in self-definition and self-management: women's general interest magazines. Far from being extinguished by the disappearance of the professional housewife, this sector of publishing has expanded in the UK since the mid-1980s (Braithwaite, 1995) . For many years market niches were defined along two axes: age and income (Braithwaite, 1995 passim; Ferguson, 1983: 210) . It was taken for granted that the third key market variable -having responsibility for a household and dependent children -could be collapsed into age. In recent years both the remodelling of old titles and new launches have been driven by the disappearance of this symmetry, coupled with the wholesale incorporation of mothers into the labour market. What now sustains the 'general interest' genre in the face of this fragmentation? It is, I would suggest, the theme of emotional work which unites the more controversial, sexuality-dominated titles aimed at women in their late teens and early twenties (Minx; More) with UK Marie Claire's highly successful, twenty-tosomething-something, non-child-oriented pitch with the eternal verities of Good Housekeeping. While the style may have moved from didactic to collegial or matey, all contain very extensive material on the management of relationships, primarily with partners but also with children, kin and friends.
To regard texts themselves as significant is not, however, to lapse into a model of the audience as passive objects of ideological domination or tutelage. Consumers of women's magazines can be as much engaged in a reflexive activity as those using Giddens' more obviously instructional sources, as Hermes' Reading Women's Magazines (1995) demonstrates. Faith in the 'active reader' is so central to Hermes' purpose that she includes little mention of magazine content. Instead she constructs 'repertoires' of use from detailed interviews with readers. One is 'emotional learning and connected knowing' where readers talk of the cognitive knowledge and emotional reassurance that they get from reading about how other people faced and overcame difficulties, whether celebrity or not. Hermes (1995) captures this relationship of reader to text in terms that directly echo Beck's motif of risk:
The repertoire of connected knowing is one way of coming to terms with what in the end are the highly shaky pillars we build our lives on: the expectation that a love relationship will continue, that loved ones will be healthy and will, preferably, outlive us, that we ourselves be healthy, that our careers will not be wrecked, that our children will grow up to be responsible adults . . . (p. 45) Women's magazines have been defined as being preoccupied with consuming, copulating and coping. To what extent is this mirrored in the much newer and very profitable UK market sector of men's general interest magazines? Since, as we have seen, confessional culture now necessarily speaks to men too, do these serve as emotional lifestyle guides? In fact, while the men's genre engages enthusiastically with consuming and copulating, its take on coping is crucially different. Not private realm skills but performance in public is the dominant theme, whether it is beer-fuelled wild behaviour (Loaded; FHM) or a more sophisticated style of self-presentation and limited transgression (GQ). Despite their success, producing these magazines requires negotiating a territory full of hazards. In Anglo-American culture, too much concern about self-care and appearance still does not sit comfortably with heterosexual masculinity, particularly among older men. Body care is thus discursively transformed into fitness and the problematic issue of men gazing on men resolved by displays of hypermasculinity: celebrities from sport used to model clothes, and laddish rampages recounted in the first person.
Like the producers, consumers are on potentially difficult terrain. As with reading women's magazines (Hermes, 1995) , the activity is thought to need justification. In the latter case, readers often point to their informational/ educational content, thus aligning themselves with commentators like Ferguson (1983) who maintain that the subtext of women's magazines is that femininity needs to be learned. For men to do the same would be to concede that masculinity is fragile, thus threatening the whole naturalized status of 'hegemonic masculinity' (Connell, 1995) . Reading one of the new lad's mags with close attention, as if to learn something, is to reveal oneself as a sad social casualty. The resolution of this dilemma, adopted by producers, by consumers and in the construction of the texts, is constantly to stress superficiality, irony and scepticism (Wright, 1998) .
Confessional culture: sustaining the tensions of late modernity
This is the clue to the appeal of broadcast and, particularly, newspaper confessional culture where men are concerned. Men's magazines dare not, as now constituted, venture into the arena of emotional work. 'Time off' and transgression are bound to dominate their texts. By contrast, buying and reading newspapers remains respectably masculine, whether as a solitary or shared activity. Without rudely leaning over, who is to say whether one is reading the racing results or 'Deidre's Photo Casebook' in The Sun? Thus they are, in a limited way, a safe site of lifestyle guidance for men struggling with new demands for emotional self-awareness and for skills in managing interpersonal relationships.
Further, there is a direct link with fundamental social issues of the public and the private spheres. As I have suggested above there is little evidence that the institutional structures of the polity and the economy are becoming more responsive to the personal circumstances and affective needs of citizens.
Rather the reverse: 'how one lives becomes the biographical solution of systemic contradictions' (Beck, 1986 (Beck, /1992 ; emphasis in the original). This process is vividly illustrated in Wajcman's (1998) account of the computer firm 'Chip' where the daily discourse of can-do opportunity, meritocracy, informality etc. coexists with a régime of utter ruthlessness in which employees are treated as 'universal workers' in a quintessentially Parsonian sense. Their non-work responsibilities are not 'Chip's' problem; they alone are responsible for acquiring and deploying the resources of material and emotional self-management needed to survive.
'Confessional culture', therefore, is not about the erosion of the public/ private and rational/emotional dualities of modernity but a yet further manifestation of attempts to sustain them. It is about holding back the remorseless logic of that modernity, a mission which the Daily Mail would surely completely endorse. The message of the I-me-mine columns, whether dealing with trivial or transcendent issues, is to read, mark and learn. It is to derive universal conclusions rather than wallow in visceral intersubjectivity. As the British Press Awards citation for Columnist of the Year put it (Press Gazette British Press Awards Supplement 1998; my emphasis): 'Ruth Picardie faced her tragically early death with an exemplary fortitude reflected in a series of moving articles written with great honesty and a conspicuous lack of sentimentality'.
Note
1
The BBC's main evening bulletin has since been moved to 10 pm but with an essentially unchanged format.
